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AVOIDING DELIBERATION: WHY THE “SAFE SPACE”
CAMPUS CANNOT COMPORT WITH DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks
our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see
things from the standpoint of others and the limits of our
vision are brought home to us . . . The benefits from
discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators
are limited in knowledge and ability to reason. No one of
them knows everything the others know, or can make all the
same inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a
way of combining information and enlarging the range of
arguments.
—John Rawls, A Theory of Justice

In November of 2015 Jonathan Butler, a student at the
University of Missouri, started a hunger strike in response to
the university president’s lack of concern for various racist
incidents on campus.1 Eventually, the Mizzou football team
joined Butler in his strike when the team refused to practice or
play another game until the president of the university
resigned.2 The protest sparked a much larger protest on
campus and resulted in thousands of protestors on the
university quad.3 The protests were sparked by the occurrence
of racist vandalism and epithets used to disparage black
student groups and individual black students.4 The university
1 Jason M. Vaughn, Mizzou Protestors: Stay Out of Our ‘Safe Space’ or We’ll
Call
the
Cops,
DAILY
BEAST
(Nov.
9,
2015,
2:20
PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/09/mizzou-protesters-to-media-stay-outof-our-safe-space-or-we-ll-call-the-cops.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Alix Wiggins, Students Plead Guilty to Littering in Cotton Ball Incident at
Black
Culture
Center,
THE
MISSOURIAN
(May
5,
2010),
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/students-plead-guilty-to-littering-in-cottonball-incident-at/article_b248de86-b237-561a-8ed0-7dfcf9b9d972.html;
Michael
E.
Miller, Black Grad Student on Hunger Strike in Mo. After Swastika Drawn with
Human
Feces,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Nov.
6,
2015),
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was plagued by incidents in which students dumped cotton
balls on the steps of a black culture center, a drunk student
yelled racial slurs during a black student group’s homecoming
parade practice, and a swastika made of feces was found on
campus.5 When the president of the university resigned, an
impromptu protest coalesced on the university quad.6
The large protest on the quad received widespread media
attention from national news sources.7 However, the protest
created a hotbed for disagreement and resentment between
students and media sources when protestors attempted to
banish the media from covering the event.8 The protest area
was deemed a “safe space” for black students to go to escape
racism on campus and the “insensitivity they encounter in the
news media.”9 To keep the media from covering the event,
protestors linked arms and began to push media out of the safe
space.10 One photographer was forcibly removed by protestors.
This incident caused reporters to complain that anyone not
sympathetic to the movement was not welcome in the area.11
Hostilities toward opposing minority viewpoints on college
campuses are nothing new to this country and have been
fostered by the complicity of college administrations.12
Increased focus on civil rights and minority student retention
“has understandably given rise to new attempts by some
institutions to regulate the use of hostile, intimidating, and
harassing speech on campus.”13 However, the number of
universities that focus on regulating speech has given rise to a
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/06/black-grad-studenton-hunger-strike-in-mo-after-swastika-drawn-with-human-feces/; Thomas Dowling,
One Month Later, What’s Next for the University of Missouri Protestors?, USA TODAY
(Nov. 27, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/11/27/whats-nextuniversity-of-missouri/.
5 Id.
6 Vaughn, supra note 1.
7 See supra notes 1–4.
8 Vaughn, supra note 1.
9 Terrell Jermaine Starr, There’s a Good Reason Protesters at the University of
Missouri Didn’t Want the Media Around, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/11/theres-a-good-reasonprotesters-at-the-university-of-missouri-didnt-want-the-media-around/.
10 Vaughn, supra note 1.
11 Starr, supra note 9.
12 Richard Kirk Page & Kay Hartwell Hunnicutt, Freedom for the Thought That
We Hate: A Policy Analysis of Student Speech Regulation at America’s Twenty Largest
Public Universities, 21 J.C. & U.L. 1, 2 (1994).
13 Id.
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tension between minority students’ rights to equal education
environments and the rights of other citizens to exercise their
right to free speech in disagreement with various social
movements.14 In an attempt to combat what many universities
have deemed to be hateful speech, universities across the
country have enacted speech codes for their students.15 College
speech codes were enacted to prevent “racist, sexist, and, in
some instances, any speech that may create a ‘hostile learning
environment.’”16 Furthermore, the combination of speech codes
with the social movement of political correctness may have a
damaging chilling effect on free expression on college
campuses.17 Proponents of political correctness on college
campuses believe that because “the mere discussion of certain
ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups, the expression of
these ideas or viewpoints should not be allowed.”18 As a result,
free expression on college campuses is under attack.19
The combination of campus speech codes and political
correctness has produced college environments that are
intolerant of opposing viewpoints.20 The recent protests
advocating for safe spaces, like those on the campus of the
University of Missouri, have put viewpoint intolerance in the
media spotlight.21 Part II of this Note examines the state of free
expression on college campuses.22 Part III discusses the role of
free expression and deliberation in a democracy.23 Part IV
argues that the establishment of safe spaces is an attempt to

Id. at 3.
Melanie A. Moore, Free Speech on College Campuses: Protecting the First
Amendment in the Marketplace of Ideas, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 511, 513 (1994).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 517–18.
18 Craig B. Anderson, Comment, Political Correctness on College Campuses:
Freedom of Speech v. Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 171, 174
(1993).
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding From Scary Ideas, NEW YORK
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judithshulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ideas.html?_r=0; Conor Friedersdorf, Campus Activists
Weaponize
‘Safe
Space’,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
10,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/how-campus-activists-areweaponizing-the-safe-space/415080/; Charles M. Blow, Race, College and Safe Space,
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/opinion/racecollege-and-safe-space.html.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See infra Part III.
14
15
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avoid deliberation on topics and ideas that college students do
not like.24 Lastly, Part IV also argues that safe spaces that chill
the speech of those with opposing viewpoints cannot satisfy the
requirements of a deliberative democracy and therefore hurt
the democratic process.25 In order to solve the problem of public
college campuses chilling speech of unpopular opinions, those
colleges should embrace the theory of deliberative democracy in
crafting their policies for dealing with unpopular protests or
speakers.
II.

THE RISE OF THE SAFE SPACE CAMPUS AND THE
STATE OF FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS

The safe space campus is a theoretical campus in which
students are zealously opposed to ideas that are not widely
accepted in their college social circles. Recently on college
campuses, college administrations have focused on regulating
speech that most of society has deemed “hostile, intimidating,
or harassing.”26 Many schools, rightfully so, have sought to
eliminate hate speech from their campuses.27 However,
overzealous regulation of speech has led to a tension between
“the rights of minorities to fair and equal educations,
environment, and opportunity” and “the rights of citizens of the
United States to exercise freedom of speech, even when that
speech is demeaning to others.”28 Furthermore, the
combination of administration-imposed speech codes and the
rise of the political correctness philosophy has resulted in a
learning environment in which the discussion of ideas that are
critical to the majority view are frowned upon.29
A. The State of the Law on Public College Campuses
The current state of public forum law is that the
government must allow the citizens of the United States, the
rightful owners of the streets and other public lands, use of
that land for free expression.30 The government may regulate
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 3.
Anderson, supra note 18, at 176–77.
Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 10 (“Current public forum theory now
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behavior that would be disruptive to the intended use of the
property; for example, a public baseball park may not be used
for a protest, but the sidewalks and parking lot of the park may
be used.31 However, the government may never regulate speech
based on the content of the speech.32 Any content-based
regulations imposed by the government are presumed to be
invalid.33 So long as the regulation is not content based, the
government may regulate public forum speech on public college
campuses “with respect to the time, the place, and the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related
activities.”34
The Supreme Court defined what kind of content-neutral
government regulation of speech in a public forum was
reasonable in United States v. O’Brien:35
(a) they are within the constitutional power of the
government; (b) they further an important or substantial
governmental interest; (c) the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of the free expression; and (d)
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.36

Then, in 1981, the Court decided Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness in which it supplemented the
O’Brien test with two additional requirements that any
regulations of speech must: (e) be justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech; and (f) leave open ample

concludes that governments must allow access to streets, parks, and other public
property for use by its owners, the citizen of the United States.”).
31 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800
(1985) (“Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.
Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property
without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused
by the speaker’s activities.”).
32 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.”) (citations omitted).
33 Id.
34 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (“Just as in the community at
large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in
which student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected.”).
35 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
36 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11; see O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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alternative channels for communication of the information.37
Thus, the government must overcome the six hurdles set forth
in O’Brien and Heffron in order to regulate speech in a public
forum, such as a public college campus.38
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
the Supreme Court identified the types of areas in a public
university where speech may occur and where the government
may attempt to regulate speech.39 Traditional public fora on
college campuses have been identified as “streets, sidewalks,
open mall areas, and other generally public areas on campus.”40
In Cornelius, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause the principal
purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas,
speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”41 The
Court further stated that where a public university has
designated an area as a public forum for speakers and protests,
a speaker or protestor cannot be excluded from that area
without a compelling governmental interest.42 However, the
Court has distinguished traditional public fora and designated
public fora from non-traditional public fora on a college
campus.43 A speaker or protestor on a college campus may be
excluded from a non-traditional public forum “as long as the
restrictions are ‘reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress
the expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker’s view.’”44 In Cornelius, the Court defined a nontraditional public forum as “a place or channel of
communication for use by the public at large for assembly and
speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of
37 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11; see also Heffron v. International Soc’y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981) (“We have often approved
restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest,
and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.”).
38 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647–48.
39 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
40 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11.
41 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
42 Id. (“Similarly, when the Government has intentionally designated a place or
means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a
compelling governmental interest.”).
43 Id.
44 Id. (citation omitted).
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certain subjects.”45 Cornelius solidified the Court’s support for
the idea that university campuses are the physical embodiment
of the “marketplace of ideas.”46
B. The Rise of Speech Codes on Campus
College speech codes were enacted across the country in an
attempt to root out racist, sexist, and homophobic speech that
was perceived by many to be on the rise on college campuses.47
Speech code proponents argue that instituting a speech code is
necessary to protect students from prejudice on campus.48
Proponents have pointed to the rise of “Reaganism” and
conservative values as the reason for the rise in “increased
racial tensions and hate speech at college campuses.”49
Opponents of speech codes argue that universities have
overreacted to the presence of hate speech on campuses by
enacting speech codes “without verifying the accuracy of the
complaints filed against students and without determining
whether such incidents actually occur on their campus more
than other schools.”50
Speech codes have supplemented Supreme Court precedent
barring the use of hate speech toward another individual in
public.51 In Chaplinsky, the Court recognized that “[t]here are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.”52 The Court recognized
that “fighting words” are words “which by their very utterance

Id. at 802.
Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 12 (“In addition to being viewed by the
courts as a public forum, the streets, sidewalks, and open malls of a university are also
seen as having special characteristics and missions inherent to an institution of higher
education. These special characteristics become readily apparent when looking at the
university, as judges have done, as a ‘marketplace of ideas.’”); see also Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, . . . otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”).
47 Moore, supra note 15, at 514 (“The primary argument for the enactment of
college speech codes is that universities are witnessing a terrible rise in incidents of
racist, sexist, and homophobic speech.”).
48 Id. at 514–15.
49 Id. at 515.
50 Id. at 517.
51 See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
52 Id. at 571–72.
45
46
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inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace.”53
As a result, the Chaplinsky Court designated “fighting words”
as speech that was outside the scope of First Amendment
protection.54 The Court created a test to determine what
“fighting words” are when it said that the “test is what men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely
to cause an average addressee to fight.”55 Then, in Beauharnais
v. Illinois, the Court expanded the fighting words doctrine to
include libelous statements made to groups in addition to
individuals.56 College speech codes have been enacted in order
to punish “racist, sexist, and, in some instances, any speech
that may create a ‘hostile learning environment,’” which are all
common themes that parallel the early foundational cases
dealing with fighting words and hate speech.
Despite the close parallels between the Supreme Court’s
early foundational cases on unprotected speech and the college
speech codes enacted in the 1980’s, speech codes found little
acceptance among the judiciary.57 For example, in Doe v.
University of Michigan,58 the District Court struck down a
speech code that prohibited “[a]ny behavior . . . that
stigmatizes or victimizes any individual on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, [or] sex. . . .”59 The District Court concluded
that the language describing behavior that “stigmatizes or
victimizes” was so vague that a student could not conform his
conduct to the rule and definitively know whether he was
violating the speech code.60 The Court invalidated the speech
code on due process grounds.61 Similarly, a Wisconsin District
Court struck down a similar speech code for being overbroad
and for failing to meet Chaplinsky’s fighting words test and
balancing test.62 Therefore, some courts have been unwilling to
Id. at 572.
Id. at 574.
55 Id. at 573.
56 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952) (“But if an utterance directed at an individual may
be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same
utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this a willful and
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.”).
57 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 17–23.
58 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
59 Id. at 856.
60 Id. at 867.
61 Id.
62 UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis.
1991).
53
54
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uphold speech codes that are not narrowly tailored to
unprotected speech.63
Speech codes have generally failed to pass constitutional
muster as a result of the codes being overbroad.64 Courts have
held speech codes to be overbroad when they are “designed to
burden or punish activities which are not constitutionally
protected, but . . . includes within its scope activities which are
protected by the first amendment.”65 Codes that attempt to
punish unprotected speech, but, when applied, include
protected speech, have violated the First Amendment and are
defined as being overbroad.66 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court defined the overbreadth doctrine in the context
of the First Amendment.67 In Broadrick, the Court noted that
“the First Amendment needs breathing space and the statutes
attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a
considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of
expression has to give way to other compelling needs of
society.”68 Therefore, a statute infringing the First Amendment
must be narrowly tailored and must be tied to a government
interest far more important than the individual’s interest in
free expression.69
C. The Philosophy of Political Correctness on Campus
The philosophy of political correctness (“PC”) has likewise
become popular on college campuses.70 The combination of
speech codes and self-imposed political correctness by the
student body may lead to “many students . . . being punished
as much for what they think as for what they say.”71 Political
correctness and speech codes operate very similarly since the
“political correctness philosophy posits that because the mere
63
64
65

Moore, supra note 15, at 525.
Id.
Id. (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8 (3d ed.

1986)).
66 Id. (“In other words, a court will consider a speech code overbroad if it
purports to punish only unprotected speech, such as fighting words, but also punishes
speech protected by the First Amendment.”).
67 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973).
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
70 Moore, supra note 15, at 517.
71 Id.
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discussion of certain ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups,
the expression of these ideas or viewpoints should not be
allowed.”72 Merriam-Webster defines “Politically Correct” as
“conforming to a belief that language and practices which could
offend political sensibilities (as in matters of sex or race) should
be eliminated.”73 Thus, the political correctness movement and
the enactment of speech codes on college campuses both have
similar goals: to remove racist and sexist speech from public
use.74
PC culture, like college speech codes, has undertaken a
noble cause and has succeeded.75 PC culture on college
campuses gained a foothold as a result of a rise in hate crimes
and sexual harassment.76 During the mid-nineties, a million
students reported being harassed on campus.77 Like speech
codes, PC culture assumes that certain words and actions are
inherently biased and society would be better off not using
those words. As a result, PC culture has declared various words
in the English language as being harmful and, thus, using
those words to make an argument would be akin to taking an
immoral position.
D. The Heckler’s Veto Cases
In First Amendment jurisprudence, one of the least
developed and overlooked lines of cases are the heckler’s veto
cases, which grew out of the “clear and present danger” cases.78
These cases deal with the problem that may arise when an
unpopular public speaker’s speech causes a crowd to grow
violent which may result in the government silencing the
speaker instead of the violent crowd.79 The heckler’s veto cases
are interesting because they hint that while the government
72 Anderson, supra note 18, at 174 (citing John Leo, PC Follies: The Year in
Review, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 27, 1992)).
73 Politically
Correct,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/political%20correctness (Mar. 26, 2016).
74 See supra Subpart II.B. (discussing the enactment of speech codes in order to
shield college students from speech deemed to be sexist or racist).
75 Id. at 696 (noting the rise of hate crimes and sexual harassment on college
campuses).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic
Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2006).
79 Id.
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may not be able to burden the free speech rights of individuals
or groups based on content, the government may have an
affirmative role in ensuring that unpopular viewpoints are not
censored by people or groups with opposing viewpoints.80
Heckler’s veto cases arose in the context of a public speaker
speaking to a crowd that grew violent in reaction to the
speech.81 As a result of the public speaker’s unpopular views,
the local police force will step in and ask the speaker to stop
speaking in order to avoid the crowd growing violent.82 Thus,
the government would be infringing the speaker’s First
Amendment right to speak in public as a result of opponents in
the crowd growing violent, thus, resulting in a heckler’s veto of
the speech.83 The practical implications of the heckler’s veto are
that any group of people opposed to the viewpoints of the
speaker may cause enough of a ruckus to convince the police
that public safety (or safety of the speaker) is at risk and cause
the police to shut the speech down.
In 1949, in a precursor case to the heckler’s veto line of
cases, the Court in Terminiello v. City of Chicago reversed the
conviction of Arthur Terminiello after he was arrested and
convicted of “breach of the peace” as a result of his address to
the Christian Veterans of America in a Chicago auditorium.84
Due to Terminiello’s speech, a large protest coalesced outside of
the auditorium.85 The protestors grew violent and the police
responded to “several disturbances” due to an “angry and
turbulent crowd.”86 The Court reversed Terminiello’s conviction
on the grounds that he was convicted because “his speech
stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about
a condition of unrest,” which are reasons that go against the
purpose of the First Amendment.87 The Court recognized that
“free debate and free exchange of ideas” are essential to an
80 Id. (“The relevance of heckler’s veto case law lies in its strong commitment to
fulfilling the First Amendment’s ultimate goal of allowing viewpoints to be expressed,
even when violence is in the offing.”).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2–3, 6 (1949).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 5 (“The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this
province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger,
invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on
any of those grounds may not stand.”).
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enlightened society and distinguish the United States from
“totalitarian regimes” throughout the world.88 Thus, in
Terminiello, the Court began to acknowledge the problem that
may arise when a crowd of hecklers seeks to silence an
unpopular viewpoint.89
In Feiner v. New York, Justices Black and Douglas
expressed concern that minority viewpoints would continue to
be silenced by a heckler’s veto.90 Irving Feiner was speaking
from a wooden box and was critical of “President Truman, the
American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local
political officials.”91 When Feiner “gave the impression that he
was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against the
whites,” some listeners in the crowd became visibly upset.92 As
a result, the police asked Feiner to break up the crowd and stop
speaking.93 However, Feiner refused to leave and kept
speaking, which resulted in his arrest for disorderly conduct.94
The majority recognized that “a hostile audience cannot be
allowed to silence a speaker,” but sided with the State of New
York’s argument that the police were merely keeping the
peace.95 The Court balanced Feiner’s right to speak against the
State’s right to ensure order and decided that it “should not
reverse this conviction in the name of free speech.”96 However,
Justices Black and Douglas were concerned about the Court’s
conclusion that the police may be used to suppress speech
because people with opposing viewpoints may grow violent.97
Specifically, the Justices were concerned that this type of police
action may become a police custom in dealing with unpopular

88 Id. at 4 (arguing that “it is only through free debate and free exchange of
ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change
is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is
therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes”).
89 See generally Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1.
90 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); id.
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 317.
92 Id.
93 Id
94 Id at 318.
95 Id at 320–21.
96 Id. at 321 (“It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an
instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as
here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.”).
97 Id at 326–27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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speakers.98 Justice Black remarked that the Court’s holding
meant that “minority speakers can be silenced in any city.”99
Furthermore, Justice Black ominously predicted that while an
unpopular speaker cannot be restrained from speaking, the
speaker can be silenced “as soon as the customary hostility to
his views develops.”100 Justice Black ended his dissent with an
appeal to deliberative democracy in which he noted that a
speaker seeking to convince others may exaggerate when
exercising his right to free speech, but, “in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct
on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”101 Thus, Justice
Black introduced the idea of the heckler’s veto in First
Amendment jurisprudence.
In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Court again
addressed the heckler’s veto and its effect on unpopular
speech.102 In Forsyth County, the county passed an ordinance
that required groups wishing to hold a parade to pay the
heightened cost to have a police presence at the parade.103 The
ordinance was passed in response to a civil rights march that
was met with opposition from the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”).104
When KKK counterdemonstrators began to throw rocks and
bottles, the police were forced to end the civil rights march.105
The next weekend, organizers planned an even larger civil
rights march, which consisted of twenty thousand marchers,
one thousand counterdemonstrators, and three thousand local
police and national guardsmen to keep the peace.106 The police
presence at the larger march cost $670,000, of which Forsyth
County was responsible for a small portion.107 As a result of the
large cost, the County of Forsyth passed the ordinance
requiring parades and demonstrations to pay to have police

Id. at 326–27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 329.
101 Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (Roberts, J.))
102 See generally Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
103 Id. at 126 (“The ordinance required the permit applicant to defray these costs
by paying a fee, the amount of which was to be fixed ‘from time to time’ by the Board.”).
104 Id. at 125.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 125–26.
107 Id. at 126.
98
99

Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete)

338

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/31/17 5:23 PM

[2017

presence.108 Furthermore, the county could adjust the fee based
on the amount of police presence required at the event.109 The
Court held that the ordinance was content-based because the
costs imposed on the marchers were “associated with the
public’s reaction to the speech” and “[l]isteners’ reaction to
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”110 The
Court added that “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any
more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it
might offend a hostile mob.”111
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Bible Believers v. Wayne
County, Michigan, affirmed the government’s affirmative duty
not to effectuate a heckler’s veto.112 The Bible Believers are a
Christian evangelical group that protested at the 2012 Arab
International Festival by holding up signs and hurling words
that were offensive to Muslims.113 A crowd within the festival
began to heckle the Bible Believers and, eventually, began to
throw bottles and garbage at the evangelical protestors.114 The
Wayne County Sheriff’s Office did not intervene to stop the
hecklers, but instead asked the Bible Believers to stop using a
megaphone during their demonstration.115 The Bible Believers
were given the choice to be arrested for their use of a
megaphone or leave the festival.116 The Bible Believers were
escorted from the festival under threat of arrest.117
Id.
Id. at 133–34 (“As construed by the county, the ordinance often requires that
the fee be based on the content of the speech.”).
110 Id. at 134.
111 Id. at 134–35.
112 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (“On this
record, there can be no reasonable dispute that the WCSO effectuated a heckler’s veto,
thereby violating the Bible Believers’ First Amendment rights.”).
113 Id at 238 (“As they had done the previous year, the Bible Believers traveled to
the Festival so that they could exercise their sincerely held religious beliefs.
Unfortunately for the Festival-goers, those beliefs compelled Israel and his followers to
hurl words and display messages offensive to a predominantly Muslim crowd, many of
whom were adolescents.”).
114 Id. at 239.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. (“Despite this apparent lack of effort to maintain any semblance of order
at the Festival, each time the police appeared on the video—to reprimand the use of
the Bible Believers’ megaphone, to suggest that the Bible Believers had the ‘option to
leave’ the Festival, to trot by on horseback while doing next to nothing, and to expel the
Bible Believers from the Festival under threat of arrest—the agitated crowd became
subdued and orderly simply due to the authoritative presence cast by the police officers
who were then in close proximity.”).
108
109
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The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the
First Amendment rights of the Bible Believers when the county
cut off the Bible Believers’ speech on the basis of the views that
they were expressing.118 The court found that the Bible
Believers’ speech was constitutionally protected, and “[w]hen a
peaceful speaker . . . is confronted by a hostile crowd, the state
may not silence the speaker as an expedient alternative to
containing or snuffing out the lawless behavior of the rioting
individuals.”119 The court based its heckler’s veto analysis on
the First Amendment’s importance to democracy.120 The court
recognized that the freedom to espouse political and religious
beliefs “is too important to our democratic institution for it to
be abridged simply due to the hostility of reactionary listeners
who may be offended by a speaker’s message.”121 As a result,
the court recognized that the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office
had an affirmative duty to protect the Bible Believers from
hecklers and to not effectuate the heckler’s veto.122
The current state of the law on public college campuses
requires that the government satisfy some form of heightened
scrutiny when a speaker or group is denied access to a
traditional or non-traditional public forum.123 Public college
regulations of speech through speech codes have been plagued
by vagueness and overbreadth problems in the state and
federal court systems.124 However, nearly all public college
campuses still retain speech codes that may have a chilling
effect on many forms of protected speech.125 Furthermore, the
rise of PC Culture on college campuses has contributed to the
chilling of protected speech.126 However, the Supreme Court
has laid the groundwork, through the heckler’s veto line of
cases, that government may have an affirmative duty to protect
deliberation in public forums, such as college campuses.127
Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 252.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 255 (“On this record, there can be no reasonable dispute that the WCSO
effectuated a heckler’s veto, thereby violating the Bible Believers’ First Amendment
rights.”).
123 See supra Subpart II.A.
124 See supra Subpart II.B.
125 See supra Subpart II.B.
126 See supra Subpart II.C.
127 See supra Subpart II.D.
118
119
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FREE EXPRESSION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Deliberative democracy is “a form of government in which
free and equal citizens . . . justify decisions in a process in
which they give one another reasons that are mutually
acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching
conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but
open to challenge in the future.”128 The theory of deliberative
democracy is to provide a blueprint for how the ideal American
democracy would work, and does work, when all branches of
government and the people participate in reasoned
deliberation.129 Deliberative democracy relies on “the idea that
when free and equal people come together and discuss
important decisions jointly—justifying their reasons publicly
on the basis of generally understood principles—then the
resulting policy will be both better for society and better for the
participants themselves.”130 Thus, deliberative democracy is
focused on two main goals: (1) to encourage people to deliberate
and justify their positions and (2) to produce policy that is the
best possible outcome for the most people.131 To accomplish
those goals, deliberative democracy requires that deliberators
(1) provide reasons for their positions and (2) that the reasons
be accessible to opposing deliberators.132 Furthermore, as a
theory, deliberative democracy recognizes that in a
heterogeneous democracy, such as the United States, diversity
of opinion may cause instability.133
Part III will discuss the requirements for a successful, fullyfunctioning deliberative democratic system and the threats
that a deliberative democratic system may face.134 Subpart A
will discuss the deliberative democratic requirements of
128

AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 7

(2004).
129 Maya Sen, Court Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the
American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 305 (2013).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 3–5 (discussing the three main
requirements of deliberative democracy).
133 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005) (“Our
country is more ethnically, religiously, and ideologically heterogeneous now than at
any previous time in its history—and that diversity is a source of potential
instability.”).
134 See infra Part III.
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reason-giving and accessibility.135 Last, Subpart B will discuss
the effects that a lack of deliberation may have on a democratic
society, such as enclave deliberation and political
polarization.136
A. The Requirements of Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy has two main requirements:
deliberators must provide reasons for their positions, and those
reasons must be accessible to the opposing deliberators.137 The
purpose of the reason-giving requirement is to encourage
deliberators to discover not only their policy differences, but
their policy similarities as well.138 The accessibility
requirement ensures that reasons are given in public and that
reasons are based on generally understood principles.139 When
reasons are based on generally understood principles, those
reasons are both morally acceptable and respectful of the
opposing side.140 Thus, the requirements of deliberative
democracy facilitate productive and reasoned deliberation in a
democracy by focusing on the similar morals that can be
discovered by opposing parties during deliberation.
1. Reason-giving
In a deliberative democracy, if there is deliberation of a
contentious issue among the politically relevant groups, then
each side may address opposing arguments in a respectful
manner and justify its own position to the opposing party.141
This theory incorporates “an ideal of reciprocity, in which
citizens are aware of and responsive to one another’s interests
and claims.”142 The idea of reciprocity is grounded in the idea
that “[d]eliberation cannot make incompatible views
compatible, but it can help participants recognize the moral
merit in their opponents.”143 By providing reasons for their
See infra Subpart III.A.
See infra Subpart III.B.
137 See infra Subpart III.A.
138 See supra Subpart III.A.1.
139 See supra Subpart III.A.2.
140 Id.
141 Sen, supra note 129, at 306.
142 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,
37 (1995).
143 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 11.
135
136
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political positions, deliberators are welcoming moral
disagreement from opposing deliberators.144 However, the
practice of reason-giving facilitates mutual respect among
deliberators that morally disagree by exposing the similarities
and differences on certain issues.145 Thus, when deliberators
give reasons for their positions, participants in deliberation can
learn from their opposition and use their political similarities
to “develop new views and policies that can more successfully
withstand critical scrutiny.”146 As a result, reason-giving is the
first step of deliberation in which deliberators are able to
discover “their individual and collective misapprehensions” of
the political opposition.147 Once deliberators have recognized
their similarities by noting their misapprehensions about their
political opposition, each side can begin to further develop
policies and ideas that are more accessible to their opposition.
2. Accessibility
The accessibility requirement of deliberative democracy is
made up of two internal requirements: reason-giving must be
done in public and the reasons that are given must be based on
generally understood principles.148 Thus, the accessibility
requirement means that reasons must be accessible in the
sense that they must be able to be perceived by deliberators.
Furthermore, the accessibility requirement means that reasons
must be accessible in the sense that opposing deliberators can
understand the underlying premise and support for the reason.
Deliberation behind closed doors and among private parties is
not enough. Deliberation must take place in public and “not
merely in the privacy of one’s mind.”149 When deliberation is
done in public, deliberators can “expand their knowledge,
including both their self-understanding and their collective

Id.
Id.
146 Id. at 12 (“Through the give-and-take of argument, participants can learn
from each other, come to recognize their individual and collective misapprehensions,
and develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical
scrutiny.”).
147 Id.
148 Sen, supra note 129, at 305 (arguing that deliberative democracy depends on
deliberators “justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally understood
principles”).
149 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 4.
144
145
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understanding of what will best serve their fellow citizens.”150
Thus, deliberation must occur in public in order to enable
deliberators to be responsive to the concerns and morals of the
opposing deliberators.
The requirement that deliberators give reasons based on
generally understood principles is also known as the theory of
reciprocity.151 The theory of reciprocity, which requires that
each side justify their positions in a manner that could be
understood by the opposing party, requires that parties not
base their positions on theories or ideas that are not reasonably
acceptable to the opposing side.152 For example, appeals to
religion as a support for public policy are inaccessible to others
that do not share the same religious beliefs.153 Furthermore,
positions which would violate the religious beliefs of the
opposing party would also violate the principle of reciprocity.154
Overall, the purpose of deliberative democracy is to reach a
democratic decision which may be disagreeable to certain
groups, but is still accessible to them if the disagreeing side can
understand the essential content of the decision.155 The theory
of reciprocity is not intended to reconcile views that are
irreconcilable, but it is intended to clarify specifically how two
opposing parties can come to an agreement.156 By justifying
their positions in terms that are accessible to those with
opposing viewpoints, deliberators will be able to “distinguish
those disagreements that arise from genuinely incompatible
values from those that can be more resolvable than they first
appear.”157 However, genuinely incompatible values may arise
in deliberation, thus resulting in a lack of agreement on a
particular reason’s morality.
The morality requirement is a prerequisite to providing
reasons based on generally understood principles. In order to
give a reason in terms that are generally understood, the

Id. at 12.
Id. at 4.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See Id.
155 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 4.
156 Id. at 11 (“Deliberation cannot make incompatible values compatible, but it
can help participants recognize the moral merit in their opponents’ claims when those
claims have merit.”).
157 Id.
150
151

Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete)

344

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/31/17 5:23 PM

[2017

reason must be morally acceptable to the opposing party.158 In
order to be morally acceptable to an opposing party, the
“argument for the position must presuppose a disinterested
perspective that could be adopted by any member of a society,
whatever his or her other particular circumstances (such as
class, race, or sex).”159 However, because reasonable people may
disagree on the morality of a particular view, there will often
be certain reasons and positions that are based on
unacceptable morals to the opposing side.160 Despite the
likelihood that opposing sides will settle upon moral reasons
that are unacceptable to one another, deliberative democracy
requires that deliberation on other issues continue among
opposing groups as a result of the mutual respect requirement.
Deliberative democracy requires that deliberating groups
practice mutual respect for opposing deliberators and their
viewpoints.161 Since deliberators will likely have many different
positions on many different issues, the mutual respect
requirement ensures that deliberators vehemently opposed on
one issue can compromise on other less divisive issues.162
However, the mutual respect requirement is more than just
tolerance; “[i]t requires a favorable attitude toward, and
constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one
disagrees.”163 Thus, the mutual respect requirement demands
that deliberators “affirm the moral status of their own position
and acknowledge the moral status of their opponents’
position.”164 However, the mutual respect requirement may be
abused if deliberators acknowledge an opposing deliberator’s
moral view as immoral for purposes of deliberation.165 Thus,
when a moral view is treated as immoral for the purposes of
reason-giving in deliberative democracy, the deliberator that
refuses to recognize the moral view as moral is stalling the

158 Id. at 72 (noting that deliberative democracy has a controversial morality
requirement).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 79 (discussing the mutual respect requirement “that permits democracy
to flourish in the face of (at least temporarily) irresolvable moral conflict”).
162 See id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 81.
165 Id. at 83 (“First, acknowledging the moral status of a position that one
opposes requires, at a minimum, that one treat it as a moral rather than a purely
political, economic, or other kind of nonmoral view.”).
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deliberative process.166 As a result, if deliberators abuse the
mutual respect requirement of deliberative democracy, the
entire process can come to a screeching halt.
B. The Effects of a Lack of Deliberation in a Democracy
Instability due to a diverse society is inevitable, but
deliberative democracy seeks to defuse the tension by requiring
reasoned deliberation among “all politically relevant groups.”167
Deliberative democracy relies on the participation of all
politically relevant groups because when one or more groups
exit the deliberative process, democratic progress may come to
a halt.168 A democratic process coming to a halt is evidenced by
the numerous numbers of countries that overthrew the political
establishment during the “Arab Spring,”169 as well as in the
birth of our own country through the Revolutionary War
against Great Britain.170 However, deliberative democracy can
neutralize political upheaval if politically relevant groups
continue deliberation on a contentious issue.171
In his book Designing Democracy, Professor Cass Sunstein
discussed the disastrous effects that result from a lack of
deliberation in a democracy.172 Professor Sunstein argues that
when there is a lack of deliberation in a democracy, social
groups will be driven further apart resulting in extreme
polarization.173 “Enclave deliberation,” Sunstein says, is
“deliberation within small groups of like-minded people” which
may lead to polarization of that particular social group or

166 Id. (arguing that the first requirement of mutual respect is that the opposing
party recognize the moral position of the opposing parties if they are actually moral
positions).
167 Eskridge, supra note 133, at 1294.
168 Id. (“Pluralist democracy is dynamic and fragile. It is dynamic because the
nature, composition, and balance of politically relevant groups shift over time. It is
fragile because it depends on the commitment of all politically relevant groups to its
processes. Political losers may exit the system unless they think their interests will be
accommodated or their losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”).
169 John Simpson, Who are the Winners and Losers from the Arab Spring?, BBC
(Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30003865.
170 Eskridge, supra note 133, at 1294.
171 Id. at 1295 (“Pluralist democracy potentially engages most citizens in the
affairs of governance, and that engagement encourages cooperation across the board.”).
172 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 15–
49 (2001).
173 Id. at 15 (“When like-minded people meet regularly, without sustained
exposure to competing views, extreme movements are all the more likely.”).
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“enclave.”174 Enclave deliberation closely parallels the ideas
behind establishing safe spaces on college campuses or college
speech codes enacted to protect minority viewpoints.175 The
idea of enclave deliberation presents a possible fatal flaw to the
theory of deliberative democracy because enclave deliberation
only occurs when a particular social group has either not been
granted access to deliberation or has not succeeded in the
deliberative process.176 However, the fact that enclave
deliberation may exist despite deliberative democracy does not
mean that the theory of deliberative democracy is not a good
theory.
In fact, enclave deliberation may be proof that when
deliberation fails, social groups may exit the political process,
thus bolstering the theory of deliberative democracy.177 As
stated above, deliberative democracy depends on all politically
relevant groups participating in the deliberative process.178
When a political minority feels as though its interests have not
been addressed or that it has not been given adequate
recognition in the deliberative process, the group may exit the
political process and cease deliberation.179 In fact, the problem
of groups exiting the deliberative process is not “mere theory”
because “democracies fail all the time, including those

Id.
See supra Part II (discussing the state of free expression on college campuses
and the establishment of college speech codes as an attempt to protect minority
viewpoints); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 172, at 16 (“Hence enclave deliberation
might be the only way to ensure that those views are developed and eventually heard.
Without a place for enclave deliberation, citizens in the broader public sphere may
move in certain directions, even extreme directions, precisely because opposing voices
are not heard at all.”).
176 SUNSTEIN, supra note 172, at 16 (“Group polarization is naturally taken as a
reason for skepticism about enclave deliberation and for seeking to ensure deliberation
among a wide group of diverse people. But there is a point more supportive of enclave
deliberation: Participants in heterogeneous groups tend to give least weight to the
views of low-status members—in some times and places, women, African Americans,
less educated people.”).
177 Id. at 15 (“As I will show, group polarization helps explain an old point, with
clear foundations in constitutional law in many nations, to the effect that social
homogeneity can be quite damaging to good deliberation.”).
178 Eskridge, supra note 133, at 1294 (“Pluralist democracy is dynamic and
fragile. It is dynamic because the nature, composition, and balance of politically
relevant groups shift over time. It is fragile because it depends on the commitment of
all politically relevant groups to its processes. Political losers may exit the system
unless they think their interests will be accommodated or their losses from exiting will
exceed their gains.”).
179 Id.
174
175
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generating prosperity for their citizens.”180 Thus, a political
group may exit the deliberative process when the political
group believes it will be accommodated in exchange for
reentering or the group has something further to gain from
exiting.181
Deliberative democracy relies on the idea that when free
and equal people seek to make political decisions, those people
must come together and justify their decisions, in public, and in
terms that are generally understood to all.182 The reason-giving
requirement and the accessibility requirement of deliberative
democracy ensure that deliberators are aware of the opposing
party’s view, are responsive to the opposing party’s view, and
are respectful of the opposing party’s view.183 When an
opposing party has a viewpoint that is accessible to the
opposing side, that viewpoint is both based on generally
understood principles and morally acceptable.184 If a position is
based on generally understood principles, then opposing parties
will thoroughly understand the disagreements that exist and
the areas where agreements can be made.185 Furthermore, if a
view is morally acceptable to an opposing party, then the
opposing views of deliberators can be reconciled on an outcome
beneficial to all.186 However, if there is a complete lack of
deliberation, then deliberative democracy will come to a halt
and any political decisions made will not be the result of
reasoned deliberation, but of purely partisan politics.187
Furthermore, the practical effects of a lack of deliberation are
that political groups may exit the political process and those
groups will grow further polarized.188
IV.

AVOIDING DELIBERATION

The avoidance of deliberation on college campuses can be
directly attributed to the rise of college speech codes and PC

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.
See supra Subpart III.A.
See supra Subpart III.A.1.
See supra Subpart III.A.2.
See supra Subpart III.A.2.
See supra Subpart III.B.
See supra Subpart III.B.
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culture.189 Since their widespread enactment on campuses
across the country, college speech codes have chilled speech
that college administrators have deemed to be immoral due to
their implicit racial or sexual bias. 190 A rise in PC culture
among college students further bolstered college speech
codes.191 Due to a combination of speech codes and PC culture,
college students abuse two of deliberative democracy’s most
important requirements: the morality requirement and the
mutual respect requirement.192 Due to such abuses, minority
political viewpoints may meet with strong backlash from
students who share opposing viewpoints.193 In order to protect
minority viewpoints and ensure deliberation, the Supreme
Court should consider expanding the heckler’s veto doctrine to
situations in which a heckling majority may unconstitutionally
stifle a minority viewpoint on a college campus.194 By doing so,
the Court would bolster its claim in the heckler’s veto cases
that public deliberation on political issues is the foundation of
American democracy.195
A. PC Culture and Speech Codes as a Hindrance to
Deliberative Democracy
The combination of college speech codes and studentimposed PC culture results in a lack of reasoned deliberation
on American college campuses.196 While campuses enacted
speech codes to combat a rise in deplorable conduct, they have
also been complicit in chilling speech.197 Furthermore, the selfimposition by college students of PC culture on campuses may
result in college students being punished for what they think
See infra Subpart IV.A.
See infra Subpart IV.A.
191 See infra Subpart IV.A.
192 See infra Subpart IV.A.
193 See infra Subpart IV.A.
194 See infra Subpart IV.B.
195 See infra Subpart IV.B.
196 Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds
and Manners, 63 TENN. L. REV. 689, 692 (1996) (noting that when it comes to PC
culture, “[s]omewhere along the way, however, the line between consciousness-raising
and common sense was grievously breached”); Moore, supra note 15, at 514 (noting
that college speech codes were enacted to combat a rise in racist, sexist, and
homophobic speech, but has actually stigmatized opposing viewpoints).
197 Moore, supra note 15, at 514–18 (showing that college speech codes were
enacted to protect college students from racist, sexist, and homophobic speech, but
were actually enacted as a response to media pressure).
189
190
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and say, regardless of whether the speech is meant to be racist,
sexist, or homophobic.198 Thus, through the imposition of
speech codes and the fostering of PC culture, public colleges are
complicit in the abuse of the morality requirement and the
mutual respect requirement of deliberative democracy, which
leads to a lack of deliberation on college campuses.
Deliberative democracy requires that reasons given during
deliberation be accessible to the opposing side.199 To be
accessible, reasons must be morally acceptable to the opposing
side.200 However, the practical effect of this requirement is that
if an opposing side deems a position or reason morally
deplorable, that opposing side may justify itself in not
participating in deliberation based on this subjective standard
of immorality.201
Both students and college administrations have abused the
morality requirement of deliberative democracy to avoid
deliberation on contentious societal issues. For example, college
speech codes, such as the one challenged in Doe v. University of
Michigan, declared that any speech that “stigmatizes or
victimizes . . . on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, [or] sex”
was immoral and could not be used by students on campus.202
By imposing this particular regulation of speech, the
University of Michigan declared a vast amount of speech as
immoral and, thus, barred it from deliberation on campus.203 In
effect, the policy classified an entire class of speech as being
immoral.204
In fact, the plaintiff in Doe v. University of Michigan was a
biology student who felt that certain theories that relied on the
biological differences between men and women could be
“perceived as ‘sexist’ and ‘racist’ by some students, and he
feared that discussion of such theories might be sanctionable”

198 Id. at 517 (noting that PC culture on college campuses may be chilling the
speech of those that are not racist, sexist, or homophobic).
199 Sen, supra note 129, at 305 (arguing that deliberative democracy depends on
deliberators “justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally understood
principles”).
200 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 72 (discussing the morality
requirement implicit in the accessibility requirement of deliberative democracy).
201 Id. (noting that because of the differing morals of deliberators, certain
positions will be unacceptable to opposing deliberators).
202 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
203 See id.
204 See id.
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under the speech code.205 Despite the University of Michigan’s
claims that the speech code only implicated immoral speech,
this case illustrates that the speech code likely chilled speech
that was not immoral and could have been discussed openly on
campus.206 The University of Michigan classified a broad range
of arguably moral speech as immoral in order to remove it from
democratic deliberation on campus, thus abusing the morality
requirement of deliberative democracy.
Similarly, PC culture has also sought to classify parts of
speech as immoral.207 PC culture gained popularity because it
sought to reduce the use of words deemed immoral due to
implicit racism and sexism, two reasonably immoral
positions.208 However, PC culture, which was revered as a
positive reaction to implicit racism and sexism, has now been
reduced to an outright rejection of common sense due to its
sweeping disqualification of many viewpoints.209 For example,
students at Emory University claimed they no longer felt safe
after chalk drawings in support of Donald Trump for President
appeared on campus.210 Emory students protested the
appearance of the chalk drawings by chanting, “You are not
listening! Come speak to us, we are in pain!” throughout the
university quad.211 The chants and comments of the Emory
University students could have resulted in a request for
deliberation on the issue of whether Trump was a good
candidate for President.212 However, those same students
claimed that the pro-Trump chalking promoted “hate and
discrimination.”213 Thus, the students protesting at Emory
Id. at 858.
Id.
207 Anderson, supra note 18, at 174 (citing John Leo, PC Follies: The Year in
Review, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 27, 1992)) (noting that PC Culture “posits
that because the mere discussion of certain ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups,
the expression of these ideas or viewpoints should not be allowed”).
208 Lasson, supra note 196, at 692.
209 Id. (noting that when it comes to PC culture, “[s]omewhere along the way,
however, the line between consciousness-raising and common sense was grievously
breached.”).
210 Susan Svrluga, Someone Wrote ‘Trump 2016’ on Emory’s Campus in Chalk.
Some Students Said They No Longer Feel Safe, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/03/24/someone-wrotetrump-2016-on-emorys-campus-in-chalk-some-students-said-they-no-longer-feel-safe/.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. (quoting a post on the Emory Latino Student Organization Facebook
page).
205
206
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University have deemed those supporting Trump for President
in 2016 as taking an immoral position that cannot satisfy
deliberative democracy.
PC culture has had the effect of a Speech Code, but without
the government action that renders speech codes
unconstitutional, like the one in Doe v. University of
Michigan.214 By shifting censorship to a social and cultural
movement (PC culture) and supplementing it with gutted
college speech codes, students and colleges combat what they
believe to be racist and sexist speech. Speech codes and PC
culture operate in such a way that reasonably moral or
questionably moral positions have been deemed to be
absolutely immoral for the purpose of deliberative democracy.
As a result, opposing deliberators have assumed that certain
positions are immoral before deliberation on campus can begin;
deliberation on issues such as the presidential election or
sexism are not being fully discussed on campus because some
deliberators cry “Immoral!” prior to deliberation. The abuse of
the morality requirement by PC culture and college speech
codes evidences a lack of mutual respect for opposing
viewpoints.
Deliberative democracy requires that deliberators practice
mutual respect to ensure that opposing deliberators can
compromise on other less contentious issues.215 However, as
illustrated by PC culture and college speech codes, certain
positions and the people who take those positions are
considered unrespectable based on their choice of political
positions.216 By dismissing opposing deliberators as unworthy
of respect, students on college campuses have misunderstood
the point of political debate and reasoned deliberation. First,
many college students fail to recognize that while an opposing
deliberator may take one position that is deplorable to them,
the two sides may share many other positions or views.217
Second, many college students misunderstand that deliberative
214 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the University of
Michigan’s speech code was unconstitutionally vague).
215 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 79.
216 Svrluga, supra note 210 (showing how Emory University students have
claimed that taking the position that Donald Trump should be President does not
deserve respect because supporting Trump is racist and hateful).
217 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 80 (noting that the purpose of
mutual respect in reasoned deliberation is to ensure cooperation on other less
contentious issues).

Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete)

352

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/31/17 5:23 PM

[2017

democracy does not require tolerance of immoral viewpoints;
“[i]t requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive
interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees.”218
Therefore, when college students on campuses such as Emory
University prematurely declare an entire political group as
immoral based on one or two policy positions, those students
abuse the moral and mutual respect requirements of
deliberative democracy.
The combination of PC culture and college speech codes
chill minority political points of view on college campuses. This
chilling effect is evidenced by the various constitutional
challenges to speech codes, as well as by examples like the
student outrage for opposing political speech on the campus of
Emory University. It is likely that many college campuses that
employ speech codes and foster PC culture cannot comport with
deliberative democracy due to abuse of the morality and
mutual respect requirements.
B. Using the Heckler’s Veto Cases to Protect Deliberation on
College Campuses
The heckler’s veto cases and their commitment to
deliberative democracy present the perfect line of cases for
dealing with the problems that speech codes and PC culture
present for college campuses. If the government forces a public
speaker to cease speaking based on the violent reaction from
the speaker’s crowd, then the government has effectuated a
heckler’s veto.219 The practical implication of the heckler’s veto
is that any group of people opposed to the viewpoints of the
speaker may cause enough of a ruckus to convince the police
that public safety is at risk, thus causing the police to end the
speech.220 In most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has
been faced with a heckler’s veto case, the Court has ruled in
favor of the speaker that claimed his First Amendment right
was infringed.221 However, in Feiner v. New York, the Court
Id.
Leanza, supra note 78, at 1308 (describing the factual situation in which
heckler’s veto cases may arise).
220 Id.
221 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (holding that a conviction
for disturbing the peace based solely on the fact that the speaker’s speech “stirred
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest” could
not stand); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (holding
that speech cannot be financially burdened “simply because it might offend a hostile
218
219
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refused to reverse a defendant’s conviction because it equated
his speech with inciting a riot.222 Despite the Court’s apparent
inconsistency in combatting heckler’s vetoes, in each decision
either the majority opinion or the dissenting opinion has
opined about the importance of deliberation and free
expression in our democracy.223
While the Court often adheres to the idea of deliberative
democracy, it has also hinted that protection for minority
speakers may extend a bit further than having their
convictions overturned for not comporting with the First
Amendment. For example, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
the Court hinted that the government may have an affirmative
duty to protect a speaker whose speech is safeguarded under
the First Amendment from a hostile crowd.224 The Terminiello
Court mentioned that protected speech may “induce[] a
condition of unrest,” but the speaker, because his speech is
protected, cannot be silenced because of the unrest that results
from disagreement in the crowd.225 The Terminiello Court
implied that police must protect speakers espousing protected
speech from a crowd that grows violent in reaction to the
speech.226 In Feiner, Justice Black argued outright that the
police had an affirmative duty to protect a speaker from an
unruly crowd if the speaker’s speech was protected by the First
Amendment.227 Justice Black recognized that the police, in this
mob”). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1951) (holding that the
speaker’s speech crossed the line into unprotected speech when it stirred a crowd to
violence and forced the police to arrest the speaker to quell the violence).
222 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321 (“It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used
as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that,
when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.”).
223 See, i.e., Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (arguing that “it is only through free
debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of
the people and peaceful change is effected.”); Feiner, 340 U.S. at 329 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“[I]n spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”).
224 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“Accordingly a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger.”).
225 Id.
226 Id. (implying that a speaker should be protected from an unruly crowd as long
as the speaker’s speech does not present a clear and present danger under Chaplinsky).
227 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, assuming that the
‘facts’ did indicate a critical situation, I reject the implication of the Court’s opinion
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case, had a duty “to protect the petitioner’s right to talk, even
to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to
interfere.”228
The Court took a similar position in Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement when it held that “[s]peech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or
banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”229 The
Court decided Forsyth County in the context of whether a state
county may charge fees for police protection at a parade or rally
that was likely to require heightened security due to hostile
crowds.230 Thus, the Court was implying that the government
and police have an affirmative duty, regardless of the cost, to
protect speakers from violent crowds.231
The Sixth Circuit has also interpreted heckler’s veto cases
as imposing an affirmative duty on the government to protect
the minority viewpoint from a hostile crowd.232 The Sixth
Circuit, in Bible Believers v. Wayne County, Michigan, noted
that the police refused to quell the violent hecklers, but instead
targeted the minority Bible Believers as being the cause of the
violence in the crowd.233 The court in Bible Believers said that
“[w]hen a peaceful speaker . . . is confronted by a hostile crowd,
the state may not silence the speaker as an expedient
alternative to containing or snuffing out the lawless behavior of
the rioting individuals.”234 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit,
police must arrest and quell violent hecklers in order to protect
constitutionally protected speakers from violence due to their
speech.235
The Supreme Court’s and the Sixth Circuit’s focus on free
that the police had no obligation to protect petitioner’s constitutional right to talk. The
police of course have power to prevent breaches of the peace. But if, in the name of
preserving order, they ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first must
make all reasonable efforts to protect him.”).
228 Id. at 327.
229 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992).
230 Id. at 126 (noting that the county ordinance was passed in order to require
demonstrations and parades to pay to have a police presence as a response to violent
crowd reactions).
231 Id. at 134–35 (“Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can
be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”).
232 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (“On this
record, there can be no reasonable dispute that the WCSO effectuated a heckler’s veto,
thereby violating the Bible Believers’ First Amendment rights.”).
233 Id. at 241.
234 Id. at 252.
235 Id. at 252–53.
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expression in a democracy, coupled with the implication that
the government has an affirmative duty to protect
constitutionally-protected speakers, illustrates that the
government has an affirmative duty to promote deliberative
democracy. Thus, when a public college effectuates a heckler’s
veto, the college has violated the tenets of both deliberative
democracy and the First Amendment of the Constitution.
However, there are numerous ways that a public college can
avoid violating the Constitution by fostering an educational
environment that enables deliberative democracy. For example,
when a political group seeks to hold a demonstration in a
traditional public forum on a college campus,236 the college
administration should reserve an adjacent tract of land for
groups with opposing viewpoints. By providing an area for
opposing viewpoints in a traditional public forum, the
deliberative democratic requirement that reasons be given in
public is satisfied.237 Furthermore, by affirmatively granting
opposing viewpoints access to an adjacent space, the public
college would foster the reason-giving requirement of
deliberative democracy.238 By granting groups with opposing
viewpoints access to the same crowd, the two groups could
make their similarities and differences better known to
passersby and to each other.239 Most importantly, by granting
access to an adjacent tract of land to opposing groups, public
colleges could combat the abuse of the morality and mutual
respect requirements of deliberative democracy by many
student groups.240 If public colleges thus fostered deliberation,
student groups abusing the morality requirement by declaring
opposing viewpoints immoral and not worthy of deliberation
would be forced to deliberate and defend the merits of their

236 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11 (noting that traditional public fora on
college campuses have been identified as “streets, sidewalks, open mall areas, and
other generally public areas on campus”).
237 Sen, supra note 129, at 305 (stating that deliberative democracy requires that
reasons be given in public).
238 Id. at 306.
239 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 12 (“Through the give-and-take of
argument, participants can learn from each other, come to recognize their individual
and collective misapprehensions, and develop new views and policies that can more
successfully withstand critical scrutiny.”).
240 See supra Subpart III.A.2. (discussing the morality requirement, which many
college students have abused by declaring many opposing viewpoints as immoral in
order to avoid deliberation on the merits).
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positions.241 Similarly, by fostering public deliberation, public
colleges would ensure that student groups that abuse the
mutual respect requirement by painting their ideological
opponents as bigots would be forced to face their opponents and
debate them on the merits.242 Thus, this hypothetical public
college would satisfy deliberative democracy and would pass
constitutional muster if challenged.
This hypothetical public college’s regulation described
above would pass constitutional muster because the regulation
allowing opposing viewpoints access to the same crowd would
be a content-neutral regulation of speech.243 First, the public
college would be furthering the important governmental
interest of fostering deliberation in a democratic society.244
Second, the government’s interest would not be related to the
suppression of the speech as long as the government has not
actively searched for opposing protestors to place on the
adjacent tract of land.245 Third, the only incidental
infringement of the First Amendment that may arise would
occur if the protestors (provided with an adjacent area to
protest) grew violent and the government effectuated heckler’s
veto against the protest that was initially planned.246 However,
if the heckler’s veto cases impose an affirmative duty on
government to protect an unpopular speaker or group from a
violent crowd, the campus police must do everything they can
to quell the violence, thus avoiding the First Amendment
issue.247
Public colleges may run afoul of the Constitution in a case
where a political speaker speaks in a non-traditional public
Id.
Id.
243 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that contentneutral regulations of speech are permissible when they further an important
governmental interest, the government’s interest is not related to suppression of the
speech, and the restriction on free speech is no greater than is essential to accomplish
the interest).
244 Id. at 377; see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(arguing that “it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that
government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is
effected.”); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 329 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)) (arguing that “in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy”).
245 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
246 Id.
247 See supra notes 221–40 and accompanying text.
241
242
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forum as defined in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund.248 The Cornelius Court defined such a forum
as “a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or
for the discussion of certain subjects.”249 Thus, when a public
college allows a political speaker to speak in a campus
auditorium, the public college has granted access to a nontraditional public forum.250 However, situations may arise
where protestors interrupt the constitutionally protected
speaker in such a way that the speaker may be asked to stop
speaking. By asking the speaker to stop speaking, rather than
removing hecklers from the auditorium, a public college would
be effectuating a heckler’s veto. In order to facilitate
deliberation and avoid the heckler’s veto problem, a public
college should require that a speaker accept questions after his
speech or allow for an opposing group to have a demonstration
outside of the auditorium. However, a public college may not
pick and choose who may enter the auditorium based on their
opposition to the speaker’s ideology or speech.251
If a public college restricted protestors’ access to a speech
given in an auditorium, the public college would be
unconstitutionally discriminating based on viewpoint.252 Thus,
the public college must allow people to attend the speech,
regardless of their group affiliation or whether they oppose the
speaker. However, once the protestor has begun to disrupt the
speaker in a way that hinders the speech or disrupts
discussion, the public college may remove the protestor due to
nonconformance with the reasonable “time, place, and manner”
restriction that a speaker in a non-traditional public forum be
allowed to speak undisturbed.253 Furthermore, removal of an
unruly protestor would be justified by the fact that the public
college allowed for a question-and-answer forum, as well as
opposing protests outside the forum. Thus, the public college
that fostered deliberation through question-and-answer session
473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (defining non-traditional public forum).
Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 800.
252 Id. (holding that public colleges may not exclude expression merely because
the public college opposes the speaker’s view).
253 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (“Just as in the community at
large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in
which student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected.”).
248
249
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and protests outside of the auditorium could not be accused of
infringing First Amendment rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Due to the rise of college speech codes and PC culture,
college campuses have failed to foster the reasoned deliberation
that would benefit a democracy. A combination of speech codes
and PC culture has chilled speech related to minority political
viewpoints and resulted in a lack of reasoned deliberation on
college campuses across the country. Various student groups
and political organizations have abused the ideals of
deliberative democracy. They have done so by claiming that all
viewpoints of entire political groups are immoral based on only
one or two viewpoints being reasonably immoral. Furthermore,
the same student groups and political organizations have failed
to practice mutual respect for their opposing deliberators by
painting all opposing deliberators as bigoted or sexist and,
thus, avoiding deliberation. To counter these abuses, public
colleges should foster deliberation by providing counter-protest
areas for opposing viewpoints to be heard. Furthermore, public
colleges should foster deliberation when speakers give speeches
in auditoriums by requiring a question-and-answer session or
requiring that an area outside of the auditorium be reserved
for a protest to counter the speaker.
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